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Discourses of Democracy in Colonial Iraq 
Personnel sent from across the British Empire to build the new [Iraqi] state 
interacted with the remnants of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of popular 
imaginative constructions influential in British and wider European society … 
This European vision of the world the British staff confronted was sustained 
by two central tenets. First, the Ottoman Empire in Iraq was conceived as an 
Oriental Despotism. Under this rubric it was unchanging and unable to escape 
the constraints of its inherent superstitions, violence and corruption. Secondly, 
Iraq was perceived as fundamentally divided … The Iraqi state constructed by 
the British was to be an occidental one, operating in a balanced and 
harmonious way with the Iraqi people. It was to be defined in absolute 
ideological contrast to the Ottoman state, seen as despotic, inefficient and 
tyrannical. (Dodge 2005 [2003]: 43–4) 
Beyond Colonial Discourse 
It was the impact of the First World War (1914–18) and the subsequent Arab Revolt which 
brought about the ultimate demise of the Ottoman Empire and their rule over the Arab lands. 
These events ushered in the emergence of the modern nation-states of the Middle East under the 
auspices of European powers such as Britain and France who moved into much of what is now 
Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Israel, carving up the region into two zones of influence under the 
clandestine Sykes-Picot agreement (Preston 2003: 164–72). Craving the rich oil reserves of the 
Gulf region to fuel its expanding military machine, the British occupied Basra from the start of 
the war and the rest of Iraq by the end of 1918 (Kent 1976, Majd 2006, Stivers 1982). This era 
of Iraqi history, referred to here as Colonial Iraq (1921–58),1 saw the British play both an overt 
and covert role in Iraqi politics until the Revolution of 1958. 
                                                 
1 In some accounts, the Colonial era in Iraq is understood to have concluded with the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty 
in 1930 and the formal end of Britain’s mandate over Iraq in 1932. However, the latter date of 1958 has been used 
here because, until the Revolution of that year, Britain maintained a strong presence in and influence over Iraq. This 
included a military presence as well as a collection of ‘advisors’ who functioned behind the scenes, often demanding 
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On the whole, the British occupation revealed a condescending, ill-informed and 
inexperienced administration that was widely unpopular in Iraq. The British invaded Iraq ‘not 
only with army and armour’ as Muhsin Al-Musawi puts it, but with ‘an Orientalist legacy that 
spoke for and of the colonized’ (Al-Musawi 2006: 58). In Iraq, this ‘Orientalist legacy’ had the 
effect of dividing up the Mesopotamian region 
between cities supposedly ‘corrupted’ by the ‘despotism’ of the Ottoman 
Empire and a countryside which was believed to be the preserve of the ‘true 
Iraqi’ who was, nonetheless, backward, even prelapsarian, and irrational. This 
simple-minded and offensive dualism ensured that indigenous voices would 
not be listened to and indigenous agency denied. (Gregory 2004: 148) 
The evidence of such simple-mindedness is found in even the most cursory analysis of 
Colonial-era literature written about Iraq. It reveals a catalogue of tropes underpinned by 
conceptions of Iraq and its people as incapable of democracy. In the correspondence he kept 
with the British Foreign Office, Sir Arnold Wilson, the Colonial Administrator of Iraq from 
1918–20, argued that to ‘install a real Arab Government in Mesopotamia is impossible, and, if 
we attempt it, we shall abandon the Middle East to anarchy’ (Wilson 1919). Similarly, David 
Samuel Margoliouth, who was not only part of the British Administration in Iraq from 1919 but 
also a renowned and authoritative British scholar of the Middle East, attempted to connect 
Iraq’s ancient past with its subjugation under British control, arguing that ‘Iraq is used to 
foreign rule since ancient times, for it was ruled by the Mongols, the Turks and the Iranians, as 
it cannot rule itself. Thus, the Iraqis should choose the British to rule them, or to be under their 
mandatory rule and protection’ (Margoliouth 1919). 
Another example can be found in the writing of British explorer Freya Stark who spent 
much of the late 1920s and 1930s travelling the Middle East and compiling important records 
                                                                                                                                               
that the monarchs kowtowed to British interests. Britain also maintained veto powers over various military and 
bureaucratic mechanisms of the state and tightly controlled the country’s foreign relations. As Peter Sluglett has so 
succinctly put it ‘British influence was not removed [in 1932], simply employed more covertly and less directly … 
from behind the scenes’ (Sluglett 2007: 210). 
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for those back home. In one of her many letters, this one to Sir Henry Lawrence and dated 6 
March 1930, Stark offers her opinions on Iraqi democracy by arguing that, ‘The whole show 
here is run by a few rather disgusting local politicians: they don’t represent anything except 
themselves’ (Stark 1951: 127). ‘Everyone agrees’, she continues, ‘that Iraq is not fit to govern 
itself … I think the Iraqis themselves agree in this: the difference is that they don’t care so 
frightfully much about being well governed’ (Stark 1951: 128). In a classically Orientalist way, 
Stark moves forward from here to separate out British interests from Iraqi politics, stating that 
I don’t know why one should bother so much about how Iraq is governed. The 
matter of importance to us is to safeguard our own affairs. It is only because 
we assume that the two are bound together that we give so much weight to the 
local politics. It seems to me that the one only vital problem is to find out how 
things we are interested in can be made safe independently of native politics. 
If this was solved, all the rest would follow – including as much Arab freedom 
as their geography allows: for I imagine no one would wish to stay here for 
the mere pleasure of doing good to people who don’t want it. (Stark 1951: 
129) 
This kind of discourse also extended to the media debates that were going on in the United 
Kingdom during the Colonial period (J. Bernstein 2008). In a letter to the editor published in the 
London Times on 21 June 1920 the author argues: 
Eastern peoples as a rule detest efficiency and sanitation, and although the 
Arab welcomed us when we were beating the Turk … I doubt if he wishes to 
be civilized in a hurry, and certainly he resents excessive control and taxation 
… therefore the new system [of democracy] is not likely to be acceptable to 
the Arab community … [and may require] an army of occupation for many 
years until the people have become civilized and accepted our form of 
administration. (London Times, 1920) 
However, this kind of Orientalist vision of Iraqi politics is not confined to the annals of 
Colonial history, it is also evident in more recent scholarship which has sought to examine the 
Colonial era in Iraq. Elie Kedourie completely ignores the positive developments of the era, 
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instead focusing on the region’s tendency towards violence, barbarism and despotism. In one 
instance, Kedourie concludes that the politics of the Colonial period of Iraqi history are 
constituted by ‘a wretched political architecture and constitutional jerry-building of the flimsiest 
and most dangerous kind’ (Kedourie 1970: 239). This is reinforced in his later Democracy and 
Arab Political Culture, which details several democratic experiments that were conducted under 
the auspices of the British and French across the Middle East throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century (namely Iraq 1921–38, Egypt 1923–52, Lebanon 1926–75 and Syria 1928–
49). According to Kedourie the main reason these attempts at introducing constitutional rule to 
the Middle East failed is the fact that the people of the region have historically been accustomed 
to ‘autocracy and passive obedience’ (Kedourie 1994: 103). 
Despite this overwhelmingly negative picture of Iraqi politics throughout the Colonial 
epoch, some recent studies have attempted to challenge the received wisdom by asserting 
counter-histories and counter-narratives. For several notable scholars, it was not that the British 
had confronted despotism in Iraq, but that they had introduced it. The failures of the British in 
terms of their extensive nation building project and their modest attempt to bring Westminster-
style democracy to Iraq sowed the seeds of the authoritarian and tyrannical regimes that were to 
flower in later decades (Dodge 2005 [2003]: 43–61). For Hana Batatu, the British and the 
French were the first to have both the technological capability and experience to obliterate the 
existing social order and create in its place the economic and cultural conditions necessary for 
authoritarianism to emerge (Batatu 1982 [1978]). Along these same lines, Gareth Stansfield has 
recently stated that ‘The rise of authoritarianism in Iraq can be traced to the tensions caused by 
the legacies of British Colonial involvement in the formation of civilian governments that were 
more often than not perceived to be corrupt and inefficient’ (Stansfield 2007: 81). 
Despite the abject failures of the British and the authoritarianism which emerged as a 
result of their occupation, other scholars have been keen to point out that the Colonial period 
nonetheless saw a complex political landscape in Iraq which promoted varied debate and 
discourse as well as calls for genuine democratic reform (Al-Musawi 2006, Bashkin 2009, 
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Davis 2005b, Dawisha 2009). Despite the many differences among such a diverse range of civil 
and political movements, what they (mostly) held in common was the call for an end to foreign 
occupation and the formation of an independent and democratic Iraq. As Orit Bashkin has 
explained, many Iraqis of this time 
did theorize about the nature of their political regime, and some strove to 
maintain a democratic system. Moreover, the writing about democracy was 
symptomatic of a larger phenomenon within Hashemite Iraq: the creation of a 
pluralistic public sphere … Exploring aspects of heterogeneity in Iraqi society 
demonstrates how the fluid nature of groupings in Iraq created a space in 
which the views of numerous groups coexisted and enriched each other. 
(Bashkin 2009: 17) 
An examination of the complexities of Colonial Iraq reveals myriad political parties, media 
outlets 2  and protest movements and their complex role in promoting and upholding 
sophisticated and diverse discourses of democracy. This chapter documents the debates that 
circulated in the Iraqi press at the time of the British occupation and Hashemite monarchy and 
details their role in fostering vitriolic critique of the incumbent regime, in mobilizing the public 
to protest and in serving as the people’s watchdog over the elite. It is precisely the egalitarian 
and democratic tendencies found throughout the media/political nexus of Colonial Iraq that 
provide for us a new vision of Iraqi history that is directly at odds with traditional views of Iraqi 
and Middle Eastern political culture. This chapter also exposes the contradiction between 
Britain’s rhetoric as a harbinger of democracy and its contemporaneous attempts to quell Iraq’s 
free press and to curtail democratic reform. 
A Fledgling Public Sphere 
                                                 
2 It should be noted here that earlier work by the author has included a set of detailed tables that document the most 
significant media outlets of Colonial, Post-Colonial, and Re-Colonial Iraq (Isakhan 2009a: 247–75). While such 
media outlets and their respective political parties are discussed in great length throughout chapters 4, 5 and 6, much 
of the initial detail compiled in these tables has been necessarily excluded. 
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After the First World War, the British were at first welcomed by most of Iraq’s numerous 
clergymen, intellectuals and poets who took at face value the promise to deliver the ‘complete 
and definitive liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks’ and ‘the establishment 
of national Governments and Administrations drawing their authority from the initiative and 
free choice of indigenous populations’ (‘The Anglo-French Declaration’ 1918: 21). This 
honeymoon period was short-lived, however, as it became increasingly evident that such 
promises would go unfulfilled and that ‘the British neither intended to cede control of Iraq to an 
indigenous government nor planned to support Arab nationalist demands’ (Davis 2005b: 44). 
Reasoning that the Iraqis were incapable of governing themselves, the British went to great 
lengths to abolish the Ottoman governing institutions, which included the elected provincial 
councils, and installed their own political officers in a system of direct Colonial rule (Tripp 
2007 [2000]: 38). Unsurprisingly, such moves were widely resisted by the people and remained 
highly contentious across Iraq. 
Perhaps the first example of such resistance came from a subsidiary of the earlier 
Istanbul-based political party Al-Ahd, known as Al-Ahd Al-Iraqi (‘The Iraqi Covenant’), which 
effectively stood as the first political group to call for Iraqi independence from the British at the 
very earliest days of its hegemony in 1918 (Stansfield 2007: 41). It was this group that was to 
provide several of the key figures of twentieth century Iraqi politics, some staunch opponents to 
the British and their installed monarchy, and others who went on to wield significant power 
within the state apparatus (Tripp 2007 [2000]: 36). Early calls for Iraqi independence, such as 
those issued by Al-Ahd Al-Iraqi, grew substantially when the British were awarded a mandate 
over Iraq in 1920 by the League of Nations. This development, which pre-empted the 
establishment of ongoing British rule over Iraq, produced the political climate in which the 
Great Iraqi Revolution took place in 1920 (Tripp 2007 [2000]: 39–44). Having been preceded 
by a brief Kurdish rebellion in 1919, the following year saw the tribesman, religious leaders and 
secular nationalists of the central Euphrates region band together in an armed nationalist-
inspired insurgency against the British occupation. The presence of a common enemy meant 
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that the Shiites and the Sunnis came together, holding joint religio-political meetings which 
culminated ‘in patriotic oratory and poetic thundering against the English’ (Batatu 1982 [1978]: 
23). The role of poets, intellectuals and religious figures from across the many ethnic and 
spiritual divides in Iraq was central to mobilizing the people to action (Al-Musawi 2006: 49–51, 
95–9). 
This collective action promulgated a new sense of solidarity inside Iraq and prompted 
strong calls for a democratic state. Although the uprising was ultimately defeated by the British, 
the Iraqis were able to secure a number of the religiously significant southern cities for short 
periods of time. The political vacuum created by the withdrawal of Ottoman authority and then 
the temporary defeat of the British, resulted in the establishment of several civil and 
administrative organizations that functioned like local councils, particularly across the south. As 
they had done during the time of the Mamluks, the Shia clergy of Najaf made several 
democratic advances. Most notably, they agreed on the creation of a complex legislative and 
executive council, the members of which were determined by votes placed in ballot boxes at the 
entrance to the many open markets that scattered the city. As Dawisha notes, ‘this election was a 
remarkable feat as the impulse emerged spontaneously from the people themselves’ indicating 
the ability of the Iraqi people to practise the very fundamentals of democracy, autonomous of 
Western tutelage, was strong (Dawisha 2009: 49). 
Although these enclaves of autonomous democratic governance were relatively short-
lived and were quashed by the British, they are not the only indicators of a fledgling civil 
society in Iraq at this time. This same period also witnessed a dramatic upsurge in budding 
journalists with strong ties to various, particularly nationalist, political parties (Davis 2005c: 
56). These wordsmiths were generally keen to re-ignite the days of the Young Turks and 
produced a number of both relatively objective and highly partisan papers which not only 
covered contemporary events and developments but also played a role in inciting people to 
resist the British occupation. Many of these papers – some of which were the unapologetic 
mouthpiece for a particular political faction, while others claimed to be independent – asserted 
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that democracy was the most suitable form of government for Iraq’s future. Independent 
newspapers such as Al-Istiqlal (‘Independence’ of Najaf) and Al-Furat (‘The Euphrates’) 
published a series of editorials that were not only scathing in their criticism of the British 
occupation, they articulated the discourses of democracy circulating throughout Iraq at the time. 
Al-Istiqlal appeared for the express purpose of responding to ‘the occupiers’ deception, to 
disquiet them, to reveal their barbaric misdeeds’ (Al-Istiqlal cited in Ayalon 1995: 92). 
Similarly, Al-Furat played a critical role in advocating grass-roots political movements in Iraq, 
arguing that the Iraqi Revolution of 1920 was ‘similar to the Irish and Egyptian Revolutions in 
every detail … provoked by protest, inflamed by despotism and spread by the loss of liberty’ 
(Al-Furat 1920a). The paper also carried stern warnings for the British, asking them to ‘Take it 
easy’ because ‘The nation which you were against, and where you unleashed the sword, causing 
so much bloodshed and casualties among its people, in utter hatred and arbitrary rule, regardless 
of its rights and justice, this nation is to take you to task in the court of history’ (Al-Furat 
1920c). 
Building on this rhetoric, another article from the same paper seeks to explain the 
growing resistance movement in Iraq as a product of the occupation and its control over 
political dissent. The author writes, 
The nation got impatient as a result of the oppression practised by the 
occupation authority, especially in these days when Iraq’s complaints are 
everywhere in line with the principle of ‘self-determination and total 
independence’. The Iraqis realize that legal requests and peaceful 
demonstrations are useless, as they restore no right. It is especially so because 
just complaints reach no political circle abroad, as the British are in total 
control of all media and means of communication. (Al-Furat 1920b)3 
Without too much concern for the opinions and attitudes expressed in these papers, Winston 
Churchill set about hastily designing the nation-states of the modern Middle East at the Cairo 
                                                 
3 The translations of Al-Furat cited here are taken from Mushin Al-Musawi’s chapter and later book on the politics of 
Iraqi literature and journalism (Al-Musawi 1991: 206–7; 2006: 97–8). 
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Conference of 1921, attended by regional experts such as T. E. Lawrence, Sir Percy Cox and 
Gertrude Bell. It was their advice which saw the British unite the three previously autonomous 
regions, or vilayets, of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul and install Faisal I to the position of the first 
modern king of Iraq (Catherwood 2004: 127–60). Faisal was the son of Sharif Hussayn of 
Mecca who had declared himself the Caliph of all Muslims and had orchestrated the Arab 
Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. Initially, Faisal was installed as 
the king of Syria in 1920 but when the French exiled him, the British gave him a second chance, 
this time as the ruler of the fledgling Iraq. It was this sequence of events which saw a man who 
had never before set foot in the lands of Iraq, ascend the throne in a ceremony unbeknown to the 
vast majority of his subjects while the military band played the eerily symbolic ‘God Save the 
Queen’. 
Having appointed Faisal, the British staged the first of modern Iraq’s artificial 
experiments with democracy: a national referendum which garnered an impossible 96% 
endorsement of his rule (Anderson and Stansfield 2004: 14–5). The local authorities of the 
various provinces were infuriated and the clerics who had so adamantly called on Faisal to 
implement a parliament and a national constitution, now delivered fatwas (‘Religious edicts’) 
banning their loyal followers from participating in the elections for the Constituent Assembly 
until such time as the monarch yielded to the people’s call for democratization, civil liberties 
and freedom of the press (Dawisha 2005a: 13). One fatwa stated bluntly: ‘Participation in the 
elections or anything resembling them which will injure the future prosperity of Iraq is 
pronounced haram by the unanimous verdict of Islam’ (‘Propaganda and Activities Against 
Participation in Iraq Elections’ 1922). 
Sensitive to such calls, Faisal did go on to establish a number of quasi-democratic 
reforms including nation-building exercises such as the development of a highly patriotic 
national school curriculum, a new Constitution, an Electoral Law and a Parliament consisting of 
both a Majlis Al-Nuwab (‘Chamber of Deputies’) and a Majlis Al-Ayan (‘Senate’) in 1924 
which lasted until the Revolution of 1958. While these developments certainly had the 
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semblance of genuine democratic reform, the king maintained a number of powers including the 
ability to veto the parliament and issue independent decrees while the British ruled ‘largely 
behind the scenes through a system of political “advisors” appointed to the major departments 
of government to ensure that British interests were adequately represented within the system’ 
(Anderson and Stansfield 2004: 14). These steps towards democratization were little more than 
a façade designed to entrench the hegemony of the Sunni ruling elite and the British. Neither 
party was particularly interested in truly representative democracy as it would cede power to the 
majority Shia population and undermine British interests. Faisal also had a tendency to 
nepotism, favouring those Sunni Iraqi-Ottomans who had supported him in Syria and a small 
number of loyal and well-educated Jews over members of the Shiite majority or the myriad of 
other ethno-religious groups which constituted the new Iraq (Zubaida 2002: 211–2). 
This bred wide dissatisfaction with authority in Iraq and led to the emergence of several 
opposition parties. The first of these were The Iraqi National Party (Al-Hizb Al-Watani Al-Iraqi) 
and The Iraqi Renaissance Party (Hizb Al-Nahda Al-Iraqiyya), both of which formed in 1922, 
made up of a number of citizens who had been active in their resistance to British occupation. 
These opposition parties quickly set up their own daily newspapers – The Iraqi National Party 
published Mufid (‘The one who gives benefit’) and The Iraqi Renaissance Party produced Al-
Rafidayn (‘Mesopotamia’) – both of which were instrumental in mobilizing more than ten 
thousand people to demonstrate in front of the King’s palace on the first anniversary of his 
ascension to the throne, demanding a representational government and an end to British 
interference. Seeing the power these two opposition parties had amassed in such a short period, 
the British High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, seized the opportunity to outlaw both parties, 
close down their publications and expel their leadership from Iraq (Al-Musawi 2006: 50, 
Dawisha 2005a: 14, 21). 
Despite these rulings, the mid to late 1920s saw the re-emergence of several political 
parties in Iraq, including those of both the government and of the opposition. The pro-
government parties included The Progressive Party (Hizb Al-Taqaddum) which was created by 
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Prime Minister Abd Al-Muhsin Al-Sadun in 1925 and was supported by partisan newspapers 
such as Al-Alam Al-Arabi (‘The Arabic World’) and Al-Liwa (‘The Standard’) as well as its own 
paper, Al-Taqaddum (‘The Priority’). In 1930 Nuri Al-Said established The Commitment Party 
(Hizb Al-Ahd) and its paper Sada Al-Ahd (‘The New Echo’). Al-Said went on to become Iraq’s 
Prime Minister several times and, until the 1958 Revolution, he was arguably the single most 
powerful person in Iraq outside the royal family (Zubaida 2002: 211). 
In terms of opposition parties, both The Iraqi National Party and The Iraqi Renaissance 
Party re-appeared in the mid- to late-1920s, but their power base had been significantly 
diminished. Other opposition parties were more successful. In 1924 the nucleus of Iraqi 
Marxists (who were to later form the Iraqi Communist Party [ICP]4) began to gather some 
political momentum with the publication of Iraq’s most radical organ, Al-Sahifa (‘The Page’). 
Although the paper was shut down after only four months and six editions, it had printed 
translations of Communist texts from Europe, it had critiqued Shariah law for being dated and 
irrelevant to the modern world and, most radical of all, it had passionately advocated women’s 
rights and sought to free them from oppression in the form of the veil and polygamy (Salucci 
2005: 9–10). The following year The People’s Party (Hizb Al-Shab) was established and 
supported by its own eponymous newspaper while, half a decade later, The Nationalist 
Fraternity Party (Hizb Al-Ikha Al-Watani, [Ikha]) was formed, producing the highly esteemed 
Al-Bilad (‘The Country’) newspaper. Published by Christians in Baghdad, Al-Bilad changed its 
name several times throughout the 1930s to avoid censorship and, in the 1940s, regularly 
reported on civil unrest (Ayalon 1995: 93–4, Dawisha 2005a: 14–15). What these opposition 
groups and their newspapers had in common were their calls for ‘immediate independence for 
Iraq, the evacuation of British troops, and the development of a democratic and participatory 
Iraqi state’ (Davis 2005b: 49). 
                                                 
4 The ICP played a fundamental role in twentieth century Iraqi politics. For a scholarly account of this history, see 
Tareq Ismael’s The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq (Ismael 2008). 
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Despite this unity – or perhaps because of it – the British continued to interfere in Iraq’s 
domestic politics and were particularly hostile to any democratic practices or movements, 
especially if they challenged British dominion over Iraq. Dawisha discusses their meddling in 
the Iraqi parliamentary deliberations over signing the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, where the High 
Commissioner ‘stormed into the Royal palace with an ultimatum that the treaty be passed 
forthwith or the Assembly would be dissolved’ (Dawisha 2005a: 19). When the Iraqi elections 
were staged by the British in 1925, 1928 and 1930, they were designed to provide the 
semblance of democracy instead of ushering in any real reform. As Ofra Bengio notes of the 
1925 election, ‘Overall, seventy-four of the ninety-eight “proposed” candidates were elected to 
the assembly, leaving no doubt that the existing Iraqi government – and, behind it, the British – 
had interfered in the process’ (Bengio 2003: 17). 
Such interference and manipulation of the democratic processes and practices of Iraq 
raise a number of interesting questions about the despotic potential of the West. While the 
British installed governments, falsified referendums and quashed democratic movements and 
reforms, the Iraqi people continued their struggle towards a more egalitarian and inclusive 
political order. Between 1920–29, Iraq witnessed an unprecedented diversity in the nation’s 
print sector, with the establishment of 105 newspapers – many of which advocated radical 
political perspectives (Davis 2005b: 49). Even in their short lifetime, these partisan papers were 
able to invigorate the Iraqi public sphere, enabling Habermasian rational-critical debate in both 
the parliament and the streets of the nation. They served as a diligent watchdog of democracy, 
carefully detailing instances of corruption and nepotism. Collectively, this era brought with it 
the very seeds of democratization, ‘a spirit of dialogue, a willingness to listen to an opposing 
view, and an ability to compromise if the situation deemed it’ (Dawisha 2005a: 20). 
With the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty in 1930 and the expiration of Britain’s formal 
authority in 1932, Iraq became the first of the mandated regions to emerge as an ‘independent’ 
nation state (Silverfarb 1994: 11–22). Many Iraqis assumed that the United Kingdom would 
henceforth play a decreasing role inside Iraq, however, the British continued to interfere in 
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Iraq’s domestic politics until the Revolution of 1958. In addition, the democratic and egalitarian 
steps taken during the 1920s were eased somewhat during the 1930s as Iraq moved through a 
rather tumultuous decade of politics. This arguably began when the Christian Assyrians of 
northern Iraq called for complete autonomy within the fledgling nation-state, understandably 
hopeful that the end of the British mandate might provide the opportunity for them to end their 
lengthy and broad Diaspora. When the spiritual and political leaders of the Assyrians were not 
swayed by the central authority in Baghdad and the wider community proved resilient to small 
military skirmishes, Iraqi General Bakr Sidqi (himself a Kurd from the northern city of Kirkuk) 
ordered the ‘Simele massacres’ which left hundreds of Iraqi Assyrians dead by the end of 
August 1933 (Husry 1974a, 1974b, Joseph 1975). 
Within a month of the attack on the Assyrians, King Faisal I died unexpectedly, leaving 
his twenty-one year old illiterate and relatively inexperienced son, Ghazi Ibn Faisal, in the 
position of Iraq’s supreme leader (crowned King Ghazi I of Iraq). Despite the fact that Ghazi 
was opposed to continued British interference and was popular with some nationalists and even 
early pan-Arabists, his legitimacy as ruler of Iraq and his effectiveness in running the affairs of 
state were constantly brought into question by many Iraqi intellectuals and politicians (Balfour-
Paul 1982: 12, Wein 2006: 9). With his power waning, in 1936 King Ghazi supported the first 
military coup d’état in the Arab world, in which General Bakr Sidqi overthrew the civilian 
government and replaced it with military rule (Lukitz 1995: 81–90). Within a year, however, 
much of the national army withdrew their support for Sidqi and he was assassinated at Mosul 
airport. Three years later, in 1939, Ghazi I died in a mysterious car accident which many 
believed to be the work of the British (Anderson and Stansfield 2004: 18). By the end of the 
1930s Iraq had changed dramatically from the developments of the 1920s; it had witnessed the 
senseless slaughter of Assyrians, ineffective kings, military coups and assassinations of some of 
the highest officers of the state. In addition, the 1930s also saw a small circle of the elite seize 
the opportunity provided by the ‘independence’ of 1932 to exert itself over the public discourse 
of Iraq and suppress dissent. This is perhaps most evident in the media sector where a new 
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series of Press Laws imposed limitations such as the censoring of ‘criticism of the government 
or the administration’ and the suspension of ‘press organs for long and even unlimited periods’ 
(Wien 2006: 54). 
However, this is not to say that media and political freedom was completely nullified in 
the 1930s. Instead, various intellectual organizations, political parties and newspapers were 
established across Iraq throughout this era, effectively harnessing the emerging public sphere of 
the time. This included the founding of the Union of Iraqi Artisans’ Organizations (Ittihad Al-
Sanaia Al-Iraqiya) which played an instrumental role in mobilizing the citizenry towards the 
General Strike of 1931 in order to protest the British proposal of a tax on urban commerce. In 
terms of actual political parties, in 1931 Iraq witnessed the founding of the Western-inspired 
social democrats or Ahali Group (Jamiyat Al-Ahali, ‘The People’s Group’). By the mid-1930s 
Iraq was also home to political parties such as the Iraqi nationalists or Baghdad Club (Nadi 
Baghdad) and the Iraqi Communist Party, as well as the Marxist-leaning Solidarity Club (Nadi 
Al-Tadammun) and the Pan-Arab Al-Muthanna Club (Nadi Al-Muthanna) (Bashkin 2009: 52–
69, Davis 2005b: 72–5, Tripp 2007 [2000]: 82–5). 
Despite the strict press law which had been imposed since 1932, many of these new 
political parties funded their own papers and sent them out across Iraq in order to propagate 
their respective political ideologies. Newspapers such as Al-Ahali (‘The People’) gave the Ahali 
Group considerable influence across Iraq and a voice to many prominent Iraqi intellectuals 
(Bashkin 2010). Similarly, the Communist party published Kifah Al-Shab (‘The People’s 
Struggle’) and Al-Inqilab (‘The Revolt’), while the Nationalist Party had Sada Al-Istiqlal (‘The 
Echo of Independence’). Aside from these highly partisan journals, other newspapers included 
Habezbooz (a term from Iraqi folklore), a Baghdad paper that used satire to criticize the British 
occupation (Daragahi 2003: 50, Wein 2006: 55) and, perhaps Iraq’s most successful, 
professional and well-respected paper of this era, Al-Zaman (‘Time’), published by an Iraqi 
Christian. It is worth noting here that while many of these papers of the 1930s tended to change 
their party affiliations and ideological adherences according to the ‘personal interests and 
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sympathies of their owners’ they nonetheless provided ‘a lively debate on nationalist issues … 
[and] debates also related to cultural questions beyond the daily affairs’ (Wein 2006: 53). 
Aside from fostering debate on democracy in their newspapers, the political parties of this 
time also competed in national elections. Ikha took part in the 1933 elections, reasoning that it 
had an opportunity to win seats and implement reform. Although the results indicated only a 
slight change in the Parliament, the party managed to secure a significant minority of 15 seats 
and went on to criticize the government and the monarchy in the national parliament. According 
to one source, ‘the Ikha members violently attacked the Cabinet’s programme as devoid of any 
measures which would transform the administration created under the mandatory regime into 
one fit for a truly independent country’ (Khadduri 1960 [1951]: 37). In a twist of fate, the 
dominant bloc that controlled the Parliament and largely supported the monarchy dissolved in a 
matter of days and Ikha unexpectedly held the balance of power. They promptly sought to 
nullify the 1930 treaty between Britain and Iraq and called for complete independence. A crisis 
emerged in the Cabinet before King Faisal intervened and a new Government was formed with 
Ikha members assuming the prominent post of Prime Minister as well as important portfolios 
like finance and the interior. Ikha lost much of its credibility, however, for acquiescing to 
monarchical control and reneging on its demands to rescind the 1930 treaty. Although it did win 
12 of 88 seats in the 1934 election and held credible influence through 1935, Ikha were usurped 
in the coup of 1936 (Khadduri 1960 [1951]: 36–67). 
Following the tumultuous but short-lived reign of the military, new elections were held in 
1937 and again in 1939. These elections were more tightly controlled in order to produce a 
Cabinet favourable to the monarchy and less critical of the British (Khadduri 1960 [1951]: 101–
2, 143). Despite this, British academic Philip Ireland, writing in 1937 and well ahead of his 
time, argued that putting aside all its deficiencies, the Iraqi parliament 
has fulfilled an important function in the political life of Iraq. It has attracted 
the most agile brains in the country; it has reflected although imperfectly, 
public opinion; and it has served as a brake on legislation which might 
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otherwise have been forced on the country … It has served to curb the 
attempts of individual Ministers to assume a dictatorial attitude. Its right of 
interrogation … has also served to reveal irregularities in administration. It 
has, moreover, furnished an outlet for Shia aspirations for participation in the 
Government and has given tribal opinion a limited means of expression 
through the tribal representatives … The Chamber, together with the 
conservative Senate of twenty appointed notables, has, notwithstanding its 
many deficiencies, laid the foundations upon which democratic government, if 
it is to come to Iraq, must be built. (Ireland 1970 [1937]: 433) 
Not long after this, however, the Second World War (1939–45) broke out. When the fighting 
began, the government of Iraq placed the newspapers and magazines of the nation under tight 
censorship laws in an attempt to curtail anti-British sentiment. This, coupled with the severe 
economic conditions which prevailed during the war, had implications for Iraqi civil society and 
the free press, with many of the smaller papers across the region folding. Politically, the death 
of King Ghazi I in 1939 had left Iraq with his three-year-old son, King Faisal II, as the official 
head of state. Being too young to rule, Faisal II’s power defaulted to his uncle, the immensely 
unpopular and fiercely pro-British regent, Prince Abd Al-Ilah. However, the regent’s power was 
mitigated by the anti-British and Pan-Arab views of Iraq’s four leading colonels, led by Salah 
Al-Din Al-Sabbagh and otherwise known as the ‘Golden Square’. In 1941 the tension between 
the monarchy and the army came to a head, with the latter effectively staging a military coup 
that saw the young king, the regent and the Prime Minister Nuri Al-Said flee into exile (Tripp 
2007 [2000]: 100–4). The British were not fond of the Pan-Arab anti-British ideology of the 
colonels. Despite being already embroiled in the broader events of World War II, in 1941 the 
British staged the Anglo-Iraq War which saw them quickly defeat the Iraqi army (Silverfarb 
1986: 131–41, 1994: 1–7). The four colonels were subsequently tried and executed and the 
triumvirate of the boy king, the hated regent and the hawkish prime minister were reinstalled in 
Baghdad, their power propped up by the might of the British but their legitimacy and popularity 
now permanently undermined in the eyes of most Iraqis. 
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Perhaps because of this lack of popularity, the regent used the cessation of World War 
Two to announce a return to the political life of the 1920s, lifting the restrictions on the freedom 
of the press and calling for the formation or re-emergence of opposition parties. This brought 
with it an immediate spike in both the number and variety of political parties in Iraq, from pro-
government, pro-British parties, to centrist, right- and left-leaning parties, Pan-Arab, 
Nationalist, and two Marxist parties as well as a blossoming of labour unions, cultural 
movements and artistic/literary associations. This era also witnessed the emergence of two of 
Iraq’s more influential parties, the nationalist-leaning National Democratic Party (Hizb Al-
Watani Al-Dimuqrati – NDP) and the Pan-Arab-leaning Independence Party (Hizb Al-Istiqlal) 
as well as a credible expansion of the ICP (Tripp 2007 [2000]: 111–15). Once again, many of 
these parties spawned their own publications. The NDP controlled ‘The Voice of the People’ 
(Sawt Al-Ahali) and the Independence Party had ‘The Independent Standard’ (Liwa Al-Istiqlal), 
both of which launched repeated attacks against the Iraqi government, and Prince Abd Al-Ilah, 
leading to censorship that forced several name changes. These were joined by the many papers 
of the ICP which tended to be nationalist in their persuasion including the newly added Al-
Qaida (‘The Base’), Rayat Al-Shaghila (‘The Worker’s Flag’) and the later Ittihad Al-Shab 
(‘The People’s Union’) (Dawisha 2005a: 15–16, 22–3). 
It appears that, on the whole, the newspapers of this era were relatively free to express 
diverse opinions. In 1945 the opposition paper Al-Ahali published an editorial that was vitriolic 
in its critique of the government’s claim that Iraq was a democracy. It sought to remind the Iraqi 
people that in a democracy the Parliament works on behalf of the people and in their interests, 
but that in Iraq the parliament worked instead in the interests of the monarchy and the British 
(Dawisha 2009: 120). It is perhaps because of such open discussions of democracy that the 
broader Arab press of the post-Second World War era has been compared by one commentator 
to that of the press which followed the American Revolution in so far as it was dominated by 
‘the numerous, tiny enterprise, highly partisan, political party press’ (McFadden 1953: 36–7). 
Speaking specifically about Iraq, Charles Tripp has stated that the press of this era was 
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politically significant in that it gave ‘voice to trenchant criticism of political and economic 
conditions and … [outlined] ideas for the future of Iraq which were radical in their implications’ 
(Tripp 2007 [2000]: 112). 
This optimism is not unjustified given the role that the press was to play in 1948 in 
mobilizing the people of Iraq to protest against the proposed revision to the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. 
When word reached the Iraqi opposition that such amendments would bring Iraq further into 
line with British interests and extend their hegemony over the nation, they were virulent in their 
dissent, using their newspapers to encourage massive demonstrations on the streets of Baghdad 
(Silverfarb 1994: 141–55). Unfortunately this series of relatively peaceful demonstrations 
(dubbed the Wathba, ‘Outburst’) caused a panic amongst Iraq’s political elite who ordered the 
military to use any means necessary to quell the uprising. As well as arresting, imprisoning and 
torturing many of the demonstrators, the military also opened fire on the crowds several times 
(Mackey 2002: 148–9). This crack-down also had ramifications for the Iraqi political and media 
sphere, with the ruling elite taking the drastic step of banning several newspapers and increasing 
the levels of censorship. Much of the blame for the demonstrations fell on the ICP, the pro-
British government was perpetually suspicious of their political ideology and its popularity 
among the people. The demonstrations gave the government a justification for targeting the 
group and authorizing the arrest of the ICP’s leaders who were later tried and publicly hanged 
(Salucci 2005: 27–9). 
This series of events did little to quell the many Iraqi opposition and political movements, 
however, and the execution of several of the ICP’s most senior members seemed to spur on the 
movement. Through the early 1950s several new newspapers were created in southern Iraq, 
including ‘The Voice of Struggle’ (Sawt Al-Kifah in 1951), ‘The Worker’s Union’ and ‘The 
Peasant’s Struggle’ (Ittihad Al-Ummal and Nidal Al-Fallah, both in 1952) and ‘The Voice of the 
Euphrates’ (Sawt Al-Furat in 1954). Around this time, the ICP also began publishing 
newspapers that catered to the interests of the expanding number of students (Kifah Al-Talaba – 
‘The Students Struggle’) and women (Huquq Al-Mara – ‘Women’s Rights’) who held party 
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membership. Such papers helped to spur on various student demonstrations, rural challenges to 
landowner authority and industrial strikes. The ICP was able to garner support from across 
Iraq’s complex array of ethno-sectarian and religious divides, including smaller minorities such 
as Christians and Jews, via its argument that, ‘while Iraq was an Arab society, real democracy 
could only be achieved by recognizing its ethnic, linguistic and confessional diversity’ (Davis 
1992: 80). 
Mounting political pressure, combined with the continuing lack of public support for the 
Iraqi administration created a situation in which the monarchy had little choice but to allow 
Iraq’s opposition parties to take part in the 1954 election. Here, a well-known member of Iraq’s 
oppositional political scene by the name of Kamil Al-Chadirji5 had the brilliant idea of bringing 
together Iraq’s divergent opposition groups to form the National Electoral Front (Al-Jabha Al-
Intikhabiya Al-Wataniya, or NEF). In an unprecedented display of solidarity the various 
political factions of Iraq heeded the advice of Chadirji, and the NEF soon included a ‘Supreme 
Committee’ consisting of members from the NDP, the Independence Party, the emerging Baath 
Party and the ICP. Serving the Supreme Committee was a second tier made up of a wide base of 
members from Iraqi opposition groups, including various smaller parties and independents. 
The success of this model was instantly recognizable since, despite constant police 
interference, the message was rapidly disseminated to the broader Iraqi population who came 
out onto the streets to voice their approval in various campaign rallies. The subsequent elections 
have been heralded as ‘not only the freest but also the most spirited in modern Iraqi history’ 
(Davis 2005b: 102). This success was also felt at the polls where, despite a relatively short 
campaign period, the falsification of votes and intimidation and interference from government 
officials, the NEF was able to garner an unprecedented, if paltry, 14 of the 135 seats (Tripp 
2007 [2000]: 132). The central government was unnerved by the show of solidarity amongst 
                                                 
5 A former member of the National Party and the Ahali Group, Al-Chadirji later founded the NDP and served as the 
editor of the party’s newspaper, Al-Ahali, later renamed Sawt Al-Ahali. 
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Iraq’s political opposition groups and by the electoral support they received nationwide. The 
elections not only secured the NEF seats in Baghdad and Mosul (Iraq’s two largest cities at the 
time), they also threatened Nuri Al-Said’s parliamentary control. The new parliament met once 
before being dissolved by a royal decree (Batatu 1982 [1978]: 686–7). The opposition parties, 
their newspapers and their protests, were suppressed and, with the subsequent elections going 
ahead uncontested, the hegemony of the ruling elite was restored (Warriner 1962 [1957]: 125). 
Nuri was then able to conduct a small war ‘against any writers, journalists and academics whom 
he regarded as critical of the status quo’, revoking the licences of opposition parties and 
introducing restrictive legislation to further curtail ‘the freedom of the press and the right to 
hold public meetings and organize demonstrations’ (Tripp 2007 [2000]: 133). 
Conclusion 
Although the Colonial era of Iraq’s history ends with the suppression of media and political 
freedoms following the 1954 elections, Al-Musawi describes the political climate of the early 
1950s in Iraq as running ‘opposite to an oppressive but restless political climate, as the educated 
classes were effectively involved in disseminating a culture of democracy and resistance: 
democracy for the Iraqis, against martial laws and censorship, and resistance to British virtual 
control of the many cabinets that spanned the period in question’ (Al-Musawi 2006: 115). Al-
Musawi’s comment might be taken as indicative of the political climate of the entire Colonial 
period which reveals an alternative Iraqi history, a history in which the nation’s public sphere 
played a pivotal role in mobilizing the people, encouraging democratic participation, stimulating 
wide debate, coordinating dissent and serving as the watchdog of the elite. More to the point, as 
Eric Davis has argued, Colonial Iraq also ‘established a historical memory to which Iraqi 
intellectuals can return as an inspiration for a transition to democracy’ (Davis 2005b: 85). 
However, an examination of Colonial Iraq also raises questions about the discourse of 
Western democracy. In their occupation of Iraq, Britain – one of the world’s strongest advocates 
of democracy, home of the Magna Carta, the modern parliament, the first daily newspaper and 
the Fourth Estate – can be seen to have all but abandoned the ideals such institutions and 
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documents are said to represent. In their creation and occupation of Iraq, the British not only 
brought with them the Orientalist legacy common throughout the Colonial period but also 
installed the nation-state’s first Oriental despot in the form of a foreign monarch. They sought to 
quash democratic movements wherever they found them, they interfered in the nation’s 
parliament and demanded agreement to various suspect treaties. Such actions were not only 
driven by their desire for Iraq’s acquiescence to the will of empire, but also by broader 
discourses, such as Oriental despotism, which decreed that Iraq was not only unable to govern 
itself but was also incapable of sophisticated political structures such as democracy. The 
Colonial period of Iraqi history not only brings to the fore the problematic nature of this widely 
held assumption, it also reveals the contrapuntal discourses of Western civilization: a force for 
democracy and human rights on its own soil, a force for despotism and oppression abroad. 
	
